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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ability Law exception available to them, a significant restriction to
suit is removed-as a prerequisite to the use of such law, notice
must be served on an employer within 1 year of an accident.10 5 In
contrast, of course, personal injury causes of action may be com-
menced within 3 years of a tortious event.110
The impact of the Lawrence decision upon the administration
of the Workers' Compensation statute also is significant. Since
there is now greater potential for an injured employee not covered
by Workers' Compensation to recover large judgments in a com-
mon-law cause of action, it appears that employers increasingly
will elect Workers' Compensation coverage to protect themselves
from large and unexpected adverse judgments.107 Surely, this re-
sponse, which will increase the number of employees covered by
Workers' Compensation, is desirable.
Susan D. Koester
Notwithstanding court officer's declaration that defendant is
"under arrest," absence of probable cause does not require sup-
pression of evidence seized during pat-down search when other
indicia of arrest are not present
A warrantless search is considered illegal under the fourth
amendment 08 unless it falls within one of the narrow exceptions
105 N.Y. EMPL'RS LIAB. LAw § 3 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981); see note 91 supra.
1- CPLR 214 (1972 & Supp. 1980-1981).
107 See, e.g., Lane v. Flack, 73 App. Div. 2d 65, 67, 425 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (3d Dep't
1980), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 856, 857, 418 N.E.2d 671, 671, 437 N.Y.S.2d 78, 78 (1981). In Lane,
because the defendant county hospital had brought itself within the coverage of the New
York Workers' Compensation Law, recovery under such statute was held to be the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy. Id.; see Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1930); N.Y. WORK.
Comp. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1980-1981) (recovery under the Workers' Com-
pensation Law is exclusive); COMMISSION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, THE NA-
TIONAL Crvc FEDERATION, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, S. Doc. No. 419, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1914); Workmen's Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, 61st Cong., 138 (1910) (brief of H.V. Mercer). Significantly, Section 3, Group 19
of the New York Workers' Compensation Law provides that "[a]ny municipal corporation
... may bring its employees... within the coverage of this chapter... notwithstanding
the definitions of the terms 'employment', 'employer' or 'employee'" N.Y. WORK. Com.
LAw § 3(1), Group 19 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1980-1981); see 9 Op. N.Y. Comp. (1953);
1976 INF. Op. N.Y. Arr'y GEN. 140; cf. 9 Op. N.Y. Comp. 297 (1953) (village has implied
authority to elect workers' compensation coverage).
108 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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enunciated by the Supreme Court.10 9 Under one of these excep-
tions, a police officer may briefly detain an individual for question-
ing and frisk him for weapons when he reasonably suspects that
the individual is involved in the commission of a crime and
presents a danger to the officer's safety.110 When a detention rises
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures was extended to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). New
York has incorporated the language of the fourth amendment into its own constitution. See
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Thus, in New York, a court must determine whether probable
cause for a search exists before issuing a warrant. People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90, 92, 341
N.E.2d 227, 229, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (1975); CPL § 690.40(2) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
Property can be seized pursuant to a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it is
stolen, unlawfully possessed, being used to commit or conceal an offense, or constitutes evi-
dence of an offense. CPL § 690.10 (1971).
109 E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 438-44
(1978). The Supreme Court has established various exceptions to the general rule that a
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. One such exception is the search incident
to a lawful arrest. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223
N.Y.S.2d 462, 467 (1961). The right to search without a warrant upon a lawful arrest "grows
out of the inherent necessities of the situation," Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699,
708 (1948), and is designed to prevent an arrestee from escaping or destroying evidence.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 762-63; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. at 30.
A warrantless search also may be sustained when the individual being searched volunta-
rily consents. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); People v. Kuhn,
33 N.Y.2d 203, 208, 306 N.E.2d 777, 779, 351 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (1973); People v. Lane, 10
N.Y.2d 347, 353, 179 N.E.2d 339, 340, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 199 (1961); cf. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974) (third-party consent). Voluntariness of consent is de-
termined by looking to all the facts presented, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
248-49 (1973), and will be found only when the prosecution meets its "heavy burden." Peo-
ple v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 219 (1976); see
People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674-75
(1969). Exigency also may give rise to legal warrantless searches. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978); Schnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966);
People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248, cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976). For other exceptions to the general rule that searches must be
predicated upon the issuance of a search warrant, see Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions,
Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 199-201
(1977).
110 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
63-64 (1968); People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 112-13, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877, 365 N.Y.S.2d
509, 516 (1975). In Terry, the Supreme Court held that
there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weap-
ons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
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to the level of an arrest or other severe interruption of a person's
liberty, however, the officer's conduct must be supported by a
showing of probable cause,"" or any evidence seized as a result of
the encounter will be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary
rule.11 2 Recognizing that the severity of an intrusion is a question
of degree, courts have noted that there is no simple formula for
determining when a detention will require a predicate of probable
cause.11  Recently, in People v. Alba,1 1 4 the Appellate Division,
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
392 U.S. at 27. The Terry doctrine is codified in CPL § 140.50. This section permits the
detention of an individual for questioning when a police officer "reasonably suspects" that
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. See CPL § 140.50(1) (1981); cf. id.
§ 140.50(2) (court officers also may detain suspects). Moreover, if the officer "reasonably
suspects that he is in danger of physical injury," he may frisk the individual for weapons.
Id. § 140.50(3); accord, People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d at 112-13, 324 N.E.2d at 877, 365
N.Y.S.2d at 516.
"I E.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211-12 (1979); People v. Chestnut, 51
N.Y.2d 14, 20, 409 N.E.2d 958, 961, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 489 (1980); see People v. Boodle, 47
N.Y.2d 398, 401, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 1331, 418 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969
(1979). The Supreme Court has noted that "[p]robable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances ... [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed."' Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)); accord,
People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 602, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1019, 435 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683 (1980).
Although "'t]he substance of all definitions 'of probable cause' is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt,"' Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175 (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)), it has been recognized that probable cause to arrest differs
from probable cause to search in that the former always focuses upon the guilt of a particu-
lar suspect while the latter merely requires a nexus between the items to be seized and the
criminal activity. See 1 W. RINGEL, SEARcHEs & SmzuREs, ArasTS AND CONFESSIONS § 4.1(a)
(2d ed. 1981). See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 109, § 3.1(b), at 441-44. Thus, it does
not automatically follow that when a search is supported by probable cause, the criteria
necessary to justify an arrest will be satisfied. Id.; 1 W. RINGEL, supra § 4.1(a), at 4-5. In
either context, however, a determination concerning the existence of probable cause must be
reached by considering only the circumstances preceding the government's act and may not
be bolstered by subsequent events. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959);
People v. Martin, 32 N.Y.2d 123, 124, 296 N.E.2d 245, 246, 343 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (1973);
People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 467 (1961).
112 E.g., People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 401-02, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 1331, 418 N.Y.S.2d
352, 354, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 114, 324 N.E.2d
872, 878, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 517 (1975); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485,
488 (1963); J. HiRScHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 7 (1979). The rationale behind the
exclusionary rule is to deter the police from violating an individual's fourth amendment
rights, People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981),
and to prevent courts from using illegally obtained evidence. J. HmscHEL, supra, at 13-14.
See generally Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Wingo, Growing Disillusion-
ment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 575-82 (1971).
1,3 See, e.g., People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 20, 409 N.E.2d 958, 961, 431 N.Y.S.2d
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First Department, held that a law enforcement officer's declaration
to an individual that he is "under arrest" does not require a show-
ing of probable cause when there is no accompanying physical re-
straint or other indicia of arrest.115
In March 1978, the defendant, a reputed member of a terrorist
organization, 116 attended a Sunday evening session of Bronx
County Criminal Court.117 Due to previous bomb threats, court-
house officials had posted signs at the entrance to the courthouse,
warning individuals that they were subject to search.118 Because
the entrance was not monitored on weekends, the defendant en-
tered the building without interruption, sat in the rear of the
courtroom and placed his attach6 case on his lap.119 Two court of-
ficers and an Assistant District Attorney recognized the defendant
and, believing that he might be carrying a bomb, decided to search
his briefcase. 120 When the defendant adamantly refused to allow
the case to be searched, one of the officers informed him that he
was "under arrest" in order to move him to a more secluded
place. 2 1 The defendant was brought into the court clerk's office
and was told to put his hands on the counter.122 Instead of comply-
ing with this order, the defendant moved his hands toward his
485, 489 (1980).
114 81 App. Div. 2d 345, 440 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1981), appeal dismissed, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 9, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (Apr. 7, 1982).
"1 81 App. Div. 2d at 348, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
21 Id. at 346, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 230-31. The court officers and the Assistant District At-
torney believed the defendant was a member of the FALN, a notorious terrorist organiza-
tion seeking Puerto Rican independence. Id.
"" Id., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
1'8 Id. Since the courthouse entrance was not monitored on weekends, courtroom of-
ficers were responsible for conducting searches within the courthouse. Id.
119 Id. On most occasions when the defendant attended court sessions, he sat in a front
row seat. Id. at 355, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 236 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
1 0 Id. at 346, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 230-31. The officers knew that the defendant had once
participated in a demonstration outside the courthouse, that he had been arrested previ-
ously for possession of weapons and that he had threatened an Assistant District Attorney.
People v. Alba, 104 Misc. 2d 1095, 1099-100, 430 N.Y.S.2d 923, 929 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1980), rev'd, 81 App. Div. 2d 345, 440 N.Y.2d 230 (1st Dep't 1981), appeal dismissed,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (Apr. 7, 1982). Suspicions were aroused when the defen-
dant placed the attach6 case on his lap rather than on the floor beside him. 104 Misc. 2d at
1100, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
121 81 App. Div. 2d at 346, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 231. A recess had been called so that the
officers could approach the defendant in the corridor rather than in the courtroom. Id. One
of the officers testified that he told the defendant that he was under arrest only to move the
scene from the corridor to the clerk's office. Id.
122 Id. at 347, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
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midsection.1 3 Fearing that the defendant was reaching for a gun, a
court officer frisked him, discovered a loaded handgun and ar-
rested him for possession of a weapon.' The Supreme Court,
Bronx County, granted the defendant's motion to suppress the
gun, holding that because the defendant was arrested without
probable cause, the evidence seized during the pat-down search
was inadmissible.125
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed
the order of suppression, holding that the defendant was not ar-
rested prior to the discovery of the handgun, and therefore, the
search could be sustained on the basis of implied consent and exi-
gent circumstances.1 2 Writing for a divided court, 127 Justice Mar-
kewich reasoned that no arrest occurred prior to the discovery of
the handgun because the defendant had not been physically re-
strained and "[n]one of the [other] indicia of an actual arrest was
present."' 28 The court stated that the officers had "probable cause
for an inquiry" and that the "arrest" was merely "an expedient
effort to terminate the corridor scene.' ' 29 Thus, the detention of
the defendant, the court observed, was a permissible inquiry based
upon a reasonable belief that exigent circumstances required an
immediate search.130 In addition, Justice Markewich noted that the
defendant's entry into the courtroom, with knowledge of signs
warning of the right of court officers to search individuals, consti-
tuted an implied consent to such a search.' s'
Authoring a vigorous dissent, Justice Sullivan maintained that
none of the theories relied upon by the majority justified the
123 Id.
14 Id. at 356, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The attach6 case did not
contain any explosive material. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
1, 104 Misc. 2d at 1100, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30.
81 App. Div. 2d at 348, 354, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32, 235.
127 Presiding Justice Kupferman and Justice Lupiano joined in the opinion by Justice
Markewich. Justice Sullivan authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sandler
concurred.
1" 81 App. Div. 2d at 348, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 231-32. The court examined the officer's use
of the term "arrest" in relation to his conduct when he initially approached the defendant.
Since no physical restraint was directed at the defendant at that point, the majority con-
cluded that an arrest had not taken place. Id.
129 Id., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
,30 Id. The majority concluded its opinion by balancing the existence of danger against
the degree of the intrusion and determining that the officers' actions were justified. Id. at
352-54, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35.
231 Id. at 349-51, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33.
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search of the defendant. 13 2 Initially, the dissent noted that consent
could not be implied from the mere posting of signs.1 3  Moreover,
the dissent stated, there were no exigent circumstances present
that would justify a search without probable cause."3 Focusing on
the arrest issue, Justice Sullivan emphasized that the detention of
the defendant constituted an arrest regardless of whether the of-
ficers believed an arrest had taken place."3 " Since the arrest lacked
probable cause, the dissent concluded, it was illegal, requiring sup-
pression of the evidence discovered as "fruit of the poisonous
tree.",s
6
It is submitted that the Alba court incorrectly relied upon the
absence of the physical "indicia" of arrest in determining that
probable cause was not necessary to justify the detention of the
defendant. It is clear that one can be "seized" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment without physical manifestations of gov-
ernmental authority. 87 Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated
132 Id. at 356, 360, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 237, 239 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 356, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (citing Chenkin v. Bellevue
Hosp. Center, 479 F. Supp. 207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Gaoni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14
(M.D. Ala. 1978)). The dissent stated that the circumstances presented were distinguishable
from prior cases which upheld consensual courthouse searches. 81 App. Div. 2d at 357-58,
440 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38 (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (citing McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897,
899, 901 (9th Cir. 1978); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231, 1233 (6th Cir." 1972);
Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266, 270, 274 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972)). The dissent noted that the procedures employed in McMorris, Downing, and Bar-
rett were uniformly applied, and unlike the method used by the officers in Alba, gave the
individuals a choice to avoid the search. 81 App. Div. 2d at 358, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38
(Sullivan, J., dissenting). Justice Sullivan also questioned why the defendant should be de-
nied his constitutional rights merely because he was present on a weekend when the court-
house entrance was not monitored. Id., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). More-
over, the dissent observed that the defendant was the only person searched although other
spectators were carrying bags. Id. at 358, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
See 81 App. Div. 2d at 360, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 239 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). In con-
cluding that the officers' actions were not justified, the dissent examined the defendant's
conduct and the officers' knowledge of his reputation. Id. (Sullivan, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent noted that the defendant "had a constitutional right to refuse to be searched." Id.
(Sullivan, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 590, 408 N.E.2d 908, 913,
430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 584, tert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980)).
1 81 App. Div. 2d at 361, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 239 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
.36 Id., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
137 It has been recognized that an arrest can be effected without physical restraint. See
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959); People v. Smith, 62 Misc. 2d 473, 477, 308
N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970); People v. Graf, 59 Misc. 2d 61, 66-67, 298
N.Y.S.2d 224, 231 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1969). It has been held, for example, that
an arrest may occur when a police officer orders an individual to enter a police car. See
People v. Graf, 59 Misc. 2d at 66, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 231. Similarly, an arrest may take place
when a person is ordered out of his car and told to place his hands on the automobile.
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that any seizure must be justified by a showing of probable cause
unless it falls "far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an
arrest" so as to permit scrutiny under the less stringent standard
of reasonable suspicion.15 8 When the court officer in Alba told the
defendant that he was "under arrest," he did so in order to secure
the defendant's submission to authority, and therefore acted con-
sistently with traditional notions of arrest.139 Thus, it is suggested
that the situation in Alba went beyond "the brief and narrowly
circumscribed intrusions 14 0  permitted in reasonable suspicion
cases, and regardless of whether the seizure of the Alba defendant
can be technically characterized as an "arrest," the court should
have required a showing of probable cause.
It seems that the Alba court's analysis of the arrest issue, cou-
pled with its justification for the search through the use of consent
and exigency principles, represented an attempt to respond to the
People v. Dellorfano, 77 Misc. 2d 602, 607, 352 N.Y.S.2d 963, 969 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974).
See generally E. FISHER, LAW OF ARREST 42-98 (1967).
I" See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979). In Dunaway, the Supreme
Court emphasized that most seizures must be supported by probable cause, and that any
exception to this fourth amendment requirement must remain narrow in scope. Id. at 210.
The Court explained that the Terry doctrine was a creature of necessity, designed to permit
minimal intrusions which "did not fit comfortably within the traditional concept of an 'ar-
rest."' Id. at 209. Thus, the Court observed, if a seizure extends beyond the "narrowly de-
fined intrusions involved in Terry," a showing of probable cause is required. Id. at 212-13.
Applying this rule to the facts involved in Dunaway, the Court stated:
Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken
from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed
in an interrogation room. He was never informed that he was "free to go"; indeed,
he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the of-
ficers or had tried to escape their custody.. . The mere facts that petitioner was
not told he was under arrest, was not "booked," and would not have had an arrest
record if the interrogation proved fruitless ... obviously do not make petitioner's
seizure even roughly analogous to the [seizure in Terry].
Id. at 212-13 (citation omitted). It is submitted that the defendant in Alba was subjected to
a seizure at least as intrusive as that involved in Dunaway. Indeed, although the Alba de-
fendant was not transported to a police station, he was forced to accompany the court of-
ficers to another room and was specifically told that he had been arrested. See People v.
Alba, 81 App. Div. 2d at 346-47, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
,39 Although it has been stated that "mere words... cannot constitute an arrest," E.
FISHER, supra note 137, at 48; see, e.g., State v. Powers, 386 A.2d 721, 728 (Me. 1978), it has
been recognized that the additional element of submission to police authority will support a
finding that an arrest has occurred, see, e.g., 386 A.2d at 728; State v. White, 209 Neb. 218,
306 N.W.2d 906, 912 (1981). Indeed, one court has recognized that the words "you are under
arrest-are sufficient to effect an arrest of the person, if the person to be arrested is in the
presence and power of the officer and in consequence of the communication submits to the
officer's restraint." 386 A.2d at 728.
240 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 212; see note 138 and accompanying text supra.
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critical problem of bombings in public facilities.14 1 Nevertheless, it
is submitted that the court has taken a dangerous step toward cur-
tailment of an individual's rights in addressing this concern.
Rather than risk sacrificing these rights,1 42 it is suggested that the
court should encourage a uniform, minimally intrusive search at
the courthouse entrance whenever court is in session as an alterna-
tive to the type of search sustained in Alba.145
Caren L. Samplin
Pending Seider attachments survive Rush decision when defen-
dant had not raised jurisdictional defect with sufficient particu-
larity to apprise plaintiff of quasi-in-rem nature of objection
After the Seider doctrine144 was declared unconstitutional in
141 See 81 App. Div. 2d at 352-53, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 234-35.
"42 See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 452, 201
N.E.2d 32, 39, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 468 (1964) (Fuld, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1968). In Brinegar, Justice Jackson
recognized the difficulty of protecting fourth amendment rights. 338 U.S. at 181 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). He noted that many unlawful searches are never scrutinized by courts be-
cause of the absence of incriminating evidence. Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Therefore, Jus-
tice Jackson concluded that courts must often exclude evidence seized from guilty defen-
dants in. order to .protect the innocent against future unconstitutional invasions. Id.
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
143 It has been noted that despite the threat posed by public dangers, modifications in
constitutional principles should be approached with caution. See Jesmore, The Courthouse
Search, 21 U.C.LA. L. Rzv. 797, 799 (1974). The increased threat of violence in courthouses
and other federal buildings has resulted in the implementation of limited searches at the
entrances to many federal facilities. See id. at 799, 809. The constitutionality of regulations
requiring searches of all packages carried by individuals into such buildings has been up-
held. See, e.g., Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (6th Cir. 1972). The immediate
danger to property and persons is said to justify these minimally intrusive searches. Id.; see
McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1978). It is suggested that if such a proce-
dure had been employed at the Bronx courthouse whenever court was in session, the issues
involved in Alba never would have arisen. Indeed, it seems that the danger would have been
averted, and the defendant's constitutional rights would not have been affected.
144 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The Seider
doctrine provided that when a defendant had procured liability insurance with a New York
insurer doing business within the state, the insurer's obligation to indemnify would be
viewed as an attachable debt upon which jurisdiction could be predicated. Id. at 114-15, 216
N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. See generally Carpenter, New York's Expanding
Empire in Tort Jurisdiction? Quo vadis?, 22 HASTMNGs L.J. 1173, 1180-83 (1971); Stein, Ju-
risdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1075, 1105, 1116-17,
1135-36 (1968). CPLR 5201(a) defines an attachable debt as one "which is past due or which
is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor." CPLR 5201(a)
